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ABSTRACT
This paper considers an artificial noise (AN) aided secrecy rate max-
imization (SRM) problem for a multi-input single-output (MISO)
channel overheard by multiple single-antenna eavesdroppers. We
assume that the transmitter has perfect knowledge about the chan-
nel to the desired user but imperfect knowledge about the channels
to the eavesdroppers. Therefore, the resultant SRM problem is for-
mulated in the way that we maximize the worst-case secrecy rate by
jointly designing the signal covariance W and the AN covariance
Σ. However, such a worst-case SRM problem turns out to be hard
to optimize, since it is nonconvex in W and Σ jointly. Moreover, it
falls into the class of semi-infinite optimization problems. Through
a careful reformulation, we show that the worst-case SRM prob-
lem can be handled by performing a one-dimensional line search
in which a sequence of semidefinite programs (SDPs) are involved.
Moreover, we also show that the optimalW admits a rank-one struc-
ture, implying that transmit beamforming is secrecy rate optimal
under the considered scenario. Simulation results are provided to
demonstrate the robustness and effectiveness of the proposed design
compared to a non-robust AN design.
Index Terms— secrecy capacity, convex optimization, semi-
definite program (SDP), artificial noise.
1. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, multi-antenna techniques have been extensively
investigated from the perspective of providing high throughput. Re-
cently, there has been much interest in using multiple antennas to
achieve secure communication, which is known as physical-layer
secrecy. In a traditional single-input single-output scenario, the idea
of physical-layer secrecy is to add some structured redundancy in the
transmitted signal such that the desired user can correctly decode the
confidential information, but for the eavesdropper he/she cannot re-
trieve anything from the observation [1]. To make physical-layer
secrecy viable, a prerequisite is that the desired user’s channel has to
be better than the eavesdropper’s. However, this may not be satisfied
if the transmitter has only a single antenna; e.g., when the eaves-
dropper is closer to the transmitter with lower reception noise power
than the desired user. To alleviate the dependence of the channels,
recent studies are mainly focused on employing multiple antennas
to transmit, since multiple transmit antennas provide additional spa-
tial degree of freedom to degrade the reception of the eavesdropper.
A possible way to do this is transmit beamforming, which premul-
tiplies the signal by a weight vector such that the power radiation
is concentrated over the direction of the desired user. In addition to
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concentrating the signal power, a more active way is to use part of the
power to artificially generate some noise to interfere the eavesdrop-
per. This artificial noise (AN) approach was first proposed in [2],
and has been shown to be effective in improving secrecy rates [2–7].
Current studies on AN aided transmit design are mainly based
on a premise that AN lies in the orthogonal complement subspace of
the desired user’s channel in an isotropic fashion, e.g., [2–6]. This
isotropic AN design has an advantage that no eavesdropper’s channel
state information (CSI) is needed at the transmitter, thereby making
it very suitable for the passive eavesdropper scenario. On the other
hand, as demonstrated in [4, 8], when the eavesdropper’s CSI is per-
fectly known at the transmitter, e.g., when the eavesdropper is also a
user of the system, we can block the eavesdropper more effectively
by aligning AN to the eavesdropper’s direction through judicious op-
timization, rather than keeping the AN isotropically. However this
perfect CSI assumption may be too stringent. Thus, in this paper we
consider a scenario where the transmitter has only imperfect CSIs of
the eavesdroppers, and we attempt to maximize the worst-case se-
crecy rate by jointly optimizing the signal and the AN covariances.
Through a careful reformulation, we show that the AN aided worst-
case secrecy rate maximization (SRM) problem can be handled by
performing a one-dimensional line search in which a sequence of
semidefinite programs (SDPs) are involved. Moreover, we prove
that the optimal transmit covariance for the signal part admits a rank-
one structure, and thus, transmit beamforming is an optimal transmit
strategy for the scenario considered.
There are some related works worth mentioning. In [4, 8], AN
aided transmit beamforming designs are considered from a QoS per-
spective. Specifically, they focus on the signal-to-interference-and-
noise-ratio (SINR) at each receiver (including the eavesdroppers),
instead of the secrecy rate considered here. Moreover, this work con-
siders imperfect CSI in a worst-case sense. In [7], the authors con-
sider the AN design for secrecy rate maximization under the stochas-
tic CSI uncertainty model, as opposed to the worst-case deterministic
model considered here.
Notation: AH , Tr(A) and rank(A) represent Hermitian trans-
pose, trace and rank of a matrix A; I is an identity matrix of ap-
propriate size; A  0 (A ≻ 0) means A is Hermitian positive
semidefinite (definite) matrix; HN denotes the set of N -by-N Her-
mitian matrices; x ∼ CN (µ,Σ) means that x is a random vector
following a complex circular Gaussian distribution with mean µ and
covariance Σ; E{·} is the expectation operator.
2. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider a wireless network that consists of a single transmit-
ter with Nt antenna elements, and K + 1 single antenna receivers.
Among these K + 1 receivers, only one receiver is legitimate while
the others are eavesdroppers. The transmitter attempts to send a con-
fidential message to the legitimate receiver. For convenience, we re-
fer to the transmitter, legitimate receiver, and the eavesdroppers as
Alice, Bob, and Eves, respectively. Let h and gk denote Nt × 1
complex channel vectors from Alice to Bob and the kth Eve, respec-
tively. Then, the received signal can be expressed as
yb(t) = h
H
x(t) + n(t), (1a)
ye,k(t) = g
H
k x(t) + vk(t), k = 1, . . . ,K. (1b)
where n(t) ∈ C and vk(t) ∈ C are independent additive white
Gaussian noises with mean zero and unit variance; x(t) ∈ CNt is
the transmit signal vector, which possesses the following form
x(t) = s(t) + z(t).
Here, s(t) is the confidential information intended for Bob and we
define its covariance as W = E{s(t)sH(t)}; z(t) is the noise vec-
tor artificially created by Alice to interfere Eves. In this work, we
assume that z(t) and s(t) are independent, and z(t) ∼ CN (0,Σ).
Generally speaking, we wish to design W and Σ so that a good
information secrecy can be achieved.
To describe the imperfect CSI model for Eves, we assume that
Alice knows only channel estimates of gk , i.e.,
gk = g¯k +∆gk, k = 1, . . . ,K, (2)
where g¯k is the channel estimate at Alice; ∆gk represents the chan-
nel uncertainty. These uncertainties are assumed to be deterministic
unknowns with bounds on their magnitudes:
‖∆gk‖2 ≤ ǫk, k = 1, . . . ,K
for some ǫ1, . . . , ǫK > 0.
Under the above described uncertainty model, the proposed ro-
bust SRM formulation is given by [9]
R⋆(P ) = max
W,Σ
{
min
k=1,...,K
fk(W,Σ)
}
s.t. Tr(W+Σ) ≤ P,
W  0, Σ  0,
(3)
where
fk(W,Σ) = log
(
1+
hHWh
1 + hHΣh
)
− max
gk∈Bk
log
(
1+
gHk Wgk
1 + gHk Σgk
)
,
Bk = {gk ∈ C
Nt | ‖gk − g¯k‖2 ≤ ǫk}.
The function fk(·) represents the worst secrecy rate function
among all channel possibilities, for the kth Eve. Moreover, in ar-
riving at (3), s(t) is assumed to be Gaussian distributed. It should be
noted that the original SRM formulation in [9] assumes perfect CSIs
at Alice. Herein (3) can be regarded as a robust counterpart of [9],
which guarantees that the worst secrecy rate is no less than R⋆(P )
for any channel possibilities (described by Bk).
The aim of this paper is to propose a method to jointly optimize
W and Σ for (3). However, it is challenging to do so. This is be-
cause Problem (3) is nonconvex in W and Σ jointly, even under
the situation K = 1 and ǫ1 = 0. In the following section, we will
develop a tractable approach to tackling Problem (3).
3. A TRACTABLE APPROACH TO THE ROBUST SRM
To describe the proposed approach, let us rewrite (3) as
max
W,Σ,β
log
(
1 +
hHWh
1 + hHΣh
)
− log β (4a)
s.t. max
gk∈Bk
log
(
1 +
gHk Wgk
1 + gHk Σgk
)
≤ log β, ∀k (4b)
Tr(W+Σ) ≤ P, W  0, Σ  0, (4c)
where the slack variable β is introduced to simplify the objective
function. By the monotonicity of log function, we simplify (4) as
max
W,Σ,β
1 + hH(W+Σ)h
β(1 + hHΣh)
(5a)
s.t. max
gk∈Bk
g
H
k
(
W− (β − 1)Σ
)
gk ≤ β − 1, ∀k (5b)
Tr(W+Σ) ≤ P, W  0, Σ  0. (5c)
Problem (5) is a nonconvex and semi-infinite problem due to (5a)
and (5b). Let us simplify (5a) first. The idea is to apply the Charnes-
Cooper transformation [10]. To do so, we denote
W = Z/ξ, Σ = Q/ξ (6)
for some Z  0,Q  0, and ξ > 0. Problem (5) can be equiva-
lently written as
max
Z,Q,β,ξ
ξ + hH(Z+Q)h
β(ξ + hHQh)
(7a)
s.t. max
gk∈Bk
g
H
k
(
Z− (β − 1)Q
)
gk ≤ (β − 1)ξ, ∀k (7b)
Tr(Z+Q) ≤ ξP, Z  0, Q  0, ξ > 0, (7c)
which can be further reformulated as
max
Z,Q,β,ξ
ξ + hH(Z+Q)h (8a)
s.t. β(ξ + hHQh) = 1 (8b)
max
gk∈Bk
g
H
k
(
Z− (β − 1)Q
)
gk ≤ (β − 1)ξ, ∀k (8c)
Tr(Z+Q) ≤ ξP, Z  0, Q  0, ξ ≥ 0. (8d)
Here (8b) is introduced to fix the denominator of (7a); ξ > 0 in
(7c) is replaced with ξ ≥ 0 in (8d). This replacement does not
cause any problem to the equivalence since any feasible ξ of (8) must
be positive; otherwise (8b) and (8d) cannot be met simultaneously.
Readers are referred to [11] for the detailed argument.
Problem (8) is still hard to optimize due to the semi-infinite con-
straint (8c). In particular, we have to check that (8c) is satisfied
for every possible gk in Bk, which is computationally prohibitive.
To make (8c) more tractable, we need the following S-procedure,
which will be used to transform (8c) into a matrix inequality:
Lemma 1 ( [12]) Let
ϕk(x) = x
H
Akx+ 2Re{b
H
k x}+ ck
for k = 1, 2, where Ak ∈ Hn, bk ∈ Cn, ck ∈ R. The implication
ϕ1(x) ≤ 0 ⇒ ϕ2(x) ≤ 0 holds if and only if there exists µ ≥ 0
such that
µ
[
A1 b1
bH1 c1
]
−
[
A2 b2
bH2 c2
]
 0,
provided that there exists a point xˆ such that ϕ1(xˆ) < 0.
Now consider (8c). It can interpreted as the following implication:
∆gHk ∆gk − ǫ
2
k ≤ 0⇒∆g
H
k M∆gk + 2Re{g¯
H
k M∆gk}
+ g¯Hk Mg¯k − (β − 1)ξ ≤ 0, ∀k
(9)
whereM = Z− (β− 1)Q. By Lemma 1, we can rewrite the above
implication equivalently as the following matrix inequality:
Tk(Z,Q, β, µk, ξ) =[
µkI−M −Mg¯k
−g¯Hk M −ǫ
2
kµk − g¯
H
k Mg¯k + (β − 1)ξ
]
 0,
(10)
with µk ≥ 0. Substituting (10) into (8), we have
max
Z,Q,β,ξ,µ
ξ + hH(Z+Q)h (11a)
s.t. β(ξ + hHQh) = 1 (11b)
Tk(Z,Q, β, µk, ξ)  0, µk ≥ 0, ∀k (11c)
Tr(Z+Q) ≤ ξP, Z  0, Q  0, ξ ≥ 0. (11d)
While (11) has a much simpler form compared to (3), the former is
still a nonconvex problem, arising from the nonconvex constraints
(11b) and (11c). However, if we fix β in (11), then (11) is just an
SDP problem. Motivated by this, we recast (11) in the following
form:
max
β
φ(β) (12a)
s.t. 1 ≤ β ≤ 1 + P‖h‖2, (12b)
where
φ(β) = max
Z0,Q0,ξ≥0,µ≥0
ξ + hH(Z+Q)h (13a)
s.t. β(ξ + hHQh) = 1 (13b)
Tk(Z,Q, β, µk, ξ)  0, ∀k (13c)
Tr(Z+Q) ≤ ξP. (13d)
In (12b), β ≥ 1 follows from (4b); β ≤ 1 + P‖h‖2 is derived
from the following relation
β ≤ 1 +
hHWh
1 + hHΣh
≤ 1 + hHWh ≤ 1 + P‖h‖2,
where the leftmost inequality is a consequence of (4a) and the re-
quirement of nonnegative secrecy rate (or the objective value of (4)
is nonnegative); the rightmost inequality follows from Tr(W) ≤ P
and the equality holds when W = PhhH/‖h‖2.
Since Problem (12) is a single variable optimization problem,
we can perform a one-dimensional line search over β. Such a search
process involves computation of φ(β), which is obtained by solv-
ing (13). As (13) is an SDP, it can be efficiently and reliably solved
by available softwares, e.g., CVX [13]. After completing the search,
we can easily obtain the transmit covariancesW andΣ for our main
problem (3) through the relation (6).
Before we close this section, here is one remaining issue worth
investigating—what structure the optimal W⋆ should possess, or
more precisely, what the rank property of W⋆ should have. The
following theorem gives the answer:
Theorem 1 Suppose that R⋆(P ) > 01. Then, there exists an opti-
malW⋆ of (3) such that rank(W⋆) = 1.
1If R⋆(P ) = 0, then, apparently,W⋆ = Σ⋆ = 0 is optimal to (3).
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in the Appendix. A key ingredient
of proving Theorem 1 is to consider a secrecy rate related power min-
imization problem and investigate its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions. Also note that the proof is constructive and hence the
rank-one W⋆ can be found in practice. Theorem 1 provides a use-
ful physical-layer design guideline that transmit beamforming is an
optimal transmit strategy for the artificial noise aided secure trans-
mission under the scenario considered.
4. SIMULATION RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
We provide two simulation examples to test the performance of the
robust AN design proposed in Section 3 and compare it with an
equal-power-splitting isotropic AN design [6], which splits half of
the power to transmit the confidential information over the direc-
tion of h, while the remaining half, as artificial noise, is spread
isotropically in the orthogonal complement subspace of h. In the fol-
lowing simulations, we denote the normalized channel uncertainty
αk = ǫk/
√
E{‖gk‖2}, ∀k and set α1 = . . . , αK = α, i.e., the
same uncertainty level for all Eves’ channel links. The elements of
h and gk are i.i.d. complex Gaussian distributed with mean 0 and
variance 1. All results were averaged over 1000 independent channel
realizations. Fig. 1 evaluates the relationship between the worst-case
secrecy rate (i.e., the objective value in (3)) and the transmit power
level for different number of Eves. It can be seen from the figure that
the proposed robust AN design outperforms the non-robust AN de-
sign over the whole power range tested. In particular, for P = 20dB,
K = 3 and α = 0.1, the worst-case secrecy rate gap between these
two designs is about 1.5 bps/Hz. Fig. 2 shows the impact of chan-
nel uncertainty on the worst-case secrecy rate for different number
of Eves. We see in Fig. 2 that the proposed robust design achieves
a higher worst-case secrecy rate than the non-robust design over the
whole uncertainty region tested.
This paper has proposed a joint optimization approach to the
AN aided covariances design for the robust secrecy rate maximiza-
tion problem. We have shown that the corresponding robust opti-
mization problem can be handled by performing a one-dimensional
line search, in which a sequence of SDPs are involved. The present
work considers a worst-case achievable secrecy rate problem under
deterministic channel uncertainties. As a future work, it would be
interesting to study how this work may be extended to deal with
stochastic channel uncertainties, e.g., through an outage-based for-
mulation.
5. APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1: The proof consists of two steps: First, we con-
sider a secrecy rate related power minimization (PM) problem and
show that the optimal solution of the PM problem is also optimal to
our main problem (3); second, we show that the optimal W of the
PM problem has to be of rank one, and thus establish the existence
of a rank-one optimal W for Problem (3).
Step 1: Consider the following power minimization problem:
min
W,Σ
Tr(W+Σ) (14a)
s.t. min
k=1,...,K
fk(W,Σ) ≥ R
⋆, W  0, Σ  0 (14b)
where fk(W,Σ) is denoted in (3); R⋆ is the optimal value of Prob-
lem (3). Here Problem (14) aims to minimize the total transmit
power given a minimum secrecy rate specification R⋆.
Let (W¯, Σ¯) and (Wˆ, Σˆ) be optimal solutions of Problems (3)
and (14), respectively. Apparently, (W¯, Σ¯) is feasible to (14). Thus,
we have that
Tr(Wˆ+ Σˆ) ≤ Tr(W¯ + Σ¯) ≤ P, (15)
which further implies that (Wˆ, Σˆ) is feasible to Problem (3), i.e.,
min
k=1,...,K
fk(Wˆ, Σˆ) ≤ R
⋆. (16)
On the other hand, as an optimal solution of (14), (Wˆ, Σˆ) must
satisfy (14b). Therefore, combining (14b) and (16), we get
min
k=1,...,K
fk(Wˆ, Σˆ) = R
⋆
i.e., (Wˆ, Σˆ) is also optimal to Problem (3).
Step 2: To prove that the optimal W of (14) has to be of rank
one, we first re-express (14) as the following problem by using a
similar approach presented in Section 3:
min
W,Σ,α,λ
Tr(W +Σ) (17a)
s.t. hH(W+ (1− α)Σ)h+ 1− α ≥ 0 (17b)
Ak(W,Σ, α, λk)  0, k = 1, . . . ,K (17c)
W  0, Σ  0, λk ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . ,K, (17d)
where
Ak(W,Σ, α, λk) = Ak1(λk, α)− G¯
H
k
(
W+ (1− 2−R
⋆
α)Σ
)
G¯k,
Ak1(λk, α) =
[
λkI 0
0H −λkǫ
2
k + 2
−R⋆α− 1
]
, G¯k =
[
I, g¯k
]
.
We list part of the KKT conditions of (17) below
I− ηhhH +
∑K
k=1
G¯kBkG¯
H
k −Y = 0 (18a)
WY = 0 (18b)
W  0, Y  0, η ≥ 0, Bk  0, ∀k (18c)
where Y, Bk and η are dual variables associated with W, Ak and
(17b), respectively.
Premultiplying (18a) by W and making use of (18b)-(18c), we
have
W
(
I+
∑K
k=1
G¯kBkG¯
H
k
)
= ηWhhH . (19)
Therefore, the following relation holds
rank(W) = rank
(
W
(
I+
∑K
k=1
G¯kBkG¯
H
k
)) (20a)
= rank(ηWhhH) ≤ 1 (20b)
where (20a) follows from I+∑K
k=1
G¯kBkG¯
H
k ≻ 0; (20b) follows
from (19), and the fact thathhH is a rank-one matrix. SinceR⋆ > 0,
W = 0 is infeasible to Problem (14). Thus, rank(W) = 1 must
hold true, which completes the proof.
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